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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises from Richard Gomez's (hereinafter "Gomez" or "Buyer") breach of a real 
estate contract for the future purchase and sale of residential real estate from Todd Phillips in his 
capacity as Trustee of Trust "A" of the Elliott Family Testamentary Trust (hereinafter "Phillips" 
or "Seller"). The parties entered into the contract in October 2008, setting the purchase price at 
$660,000.00. Gomez paid earnest money in the amount of $66,000.00, which was released to 
Phillips in November 2008. The contract provided that closing on the purchase would occur on or 
before December 15, 2009. Gomez breached the contract in December 2009 when he informed 
Phillips that he would not be able to close as agreed. Phillips sold the real estate to a third party 
in June 2010. Phillips filed his lawsuit against Gomez in November 2013, seeking to recover 
damages in excess of the $66,000.00 earnest money Phillips had retained. 
The District Court, following a bench trial, held that Phillips was not entitled to recover 
the additional damages he requested, because he had already elected his remedy of retaining 
Gomez's earnest money as liquidated damages, pursuant to the parties' real estate contract. 
Phillips now appeals to this Court and argues that he should be allowed to recover from Gomez 
what he considers to be his "actual damages" after giving Gomez full credit for the earnest money 
he retained. Gomez argues that the District Court correctly held that Phillips had elected his 
remedy by retaining the earnest money and cannot also sue for additional damages. 
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Course of the Proceedings 
On November 6, 2013, Phillips filed his complaint against Gomez for breach of contract. 
On June 3, 2014, Gomez filed I.R.C.P. Rule 12 motions against the Complaint. On July 28, 2014, 
Phillips filed his First Amended Complaint, which Gomez answered on September 8, 2014. Both 
parties initially demanded a jury trial, but the case was ultimately tried to the court without a jury 
on September 1, 2015. 
On September 15, 2015, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
directed the entry of a judgment in favor of Gomez and against Phillips. The District Court 
concluded that "the effect of the . . . earnest money deposit [being] non-refundable and 
immediately available to the seller without restriction was to work, in effect, an advance election 
ofremedies under [the contract] to accept the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages for any 
default on the part of the buyer in failing to close." (R. Vol. I, p. 152, L. 11-15). The District 
Court held that Phillips was precluded from recovering damages for the loss of the benefit of the 
bargain, because the damages for Gomez's breach are, by contract, the liquidated damages. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 153, L. 9-13). 
On September 24, 2015, Judgment was entered finally disposing of the case in favor of 
Gomez. On September 25, 2015, Gomez filed his Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and 
Supporting Declaration. On or about October 5, 2015, Phillips filed Plaintiffs Objection to 
Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, including a supporting affidavit. The District 
Court had not yet decided the issue of attorney fees when, on October 30, 2015, Phillips filed his 
Notice of Appeal to this Court in Docket # 43678. 
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On August 16, 2016, this Court entered its Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal on the 
basis that the September 24, 2015, Judgment entered by the District Court did not comply with 
I.R.C.P. 54(a), because it contained irrelevant wording. (R. Vol. 1, p. 179). The parties were given 
until August 30, 2016, to file a Judgment conforming with I.R.C.P. 54(a). (Id.) On August 23, 
2016, the parties executed a Stipulation for Entry of Amended Final Judgment, which Phillips' 
counsel filed with the District Court. (R. Vol. 1, p. 171). The District Court did not re-enter the 
conforming Judgment until August 31, 2016. (R. Vol. 1, p. 172). On October 4, 2016, this Court 
dismissed Docket# 43678 without prejudice, because the conforming Judgment was not timely 
entered. 
On October 7, 2016, Phillips filed his second Notice of Appeal, which initiated the instant 
appeal. On November 9, 2016, this Court entered its Order Augmenting Prior Appeal, (R. Vol. 1, 
p. 167). This matter is now before the Court for determination. 
Statement of Facts 
Gomez accepts, generally, the District Court's Findings of Fact entered September 15, 
2015, as the facts of the case, with some slight variations, below. 
Todd J. Phillips is the trustee of the Elliott Family Trust, a testamentary trust established 
in Idaho, and was the personal representative of the Elliott family estates. As part of the 
administration of the decedents' estates, the Elliott Family Trust had become the owner of record 
of what had been the family residence of the grantors and testators. In the spring of 2008, the 
trustee determined to dispose of the family residence and listed it for sale with a real estate agency 
in Boise. In the fall of 2008, Respondent, Richard Gomez, submitted several offers to purchase 
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this property through the listing real estate agency. The first offer was not accepted; the second 
offer with amendments and additional terms added, was accepted. 
The documents setting forth the offer and acceptance that created the contract at issue in 
this case consisted of the following: (1) An RE-21 form Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
executed by Gomez on October 27, 2008, and by Phillips on October 30, 2008. (Ex. 2A). (2) An 
RE-11 form Addendum, marked #1, and signed by Gomez on October 27, 2008, and by Phillips 
on October 30, 2008. (Ex. 2B). (3) A manuscript document titled "Counter-Offer# 3" signed by 
both parties on October 28, 2008. (Ex. 2F). (4) A manuscript document titled "Residential Lease," 
signed by Gomez on October 29, 2008, and by Phillips on October 30, 2008. (Ex. 2G). (5) An 
RE-11 form Addendum, marked #2, signed by both parties on December 2, 2009. (Ex. 2I). 
The agreement set forth in the above documents generally provided for the deal to be as 
follows: The sale of the described real property to Gomez was to be for $660,000.00 cash. An 
earnest money deposit of $66,000.00 was to be non-refundable on satisfaction of a couple of 
contingencies: buyer's inspection and buyer's attorney's review and acceptance of the contract 
documents. Gomez was to be placed in possession of the real property promptly after the deal was 
accepted, but the sale was not to formally close until December 15, 2009. Gomez's possession of 
the property was to be further under the provisions of a lease agreement until formal close. The 
balance of the purchase price was to be due in cash at closing on December 15, 2009. 
When the agreement was finally accepted by both parties, Gomez paid the $66,000.00 
earnest money deposit into the real estate broker's trust account. Gomez moved into the property 
under the rental agreement. The entire $66,000.00 earnest money deposit was released from the 
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broker's trust account, with a portion going to the real estate agent's commission ($3,960.00) and 
the balance going to Phillips ($62,040.00). The release of the earnest money to Phillips was 
without restriction. 
In early December 2009, Gomez indicated that he might not be able to close on the deal by 
December 15, 2009. Several proposals were suggested and discussed between the parties, but 
none were formalized into an amended deal. 
On December 15, 2009, Gomez initiated an email through the real estate brokerage 
declaring that he was not able to close on December 15. (Ex. 3). 
Gomez remained in possession of the property after the scheduled closing date. An 
agreement was reached for Gomez to remain in possession under a rental agreement. A document 
to that effect, titled "Memorandum of Understanding re: Terms of Month to Month Lease," was 
created and signed by the parties in January 2010 ( executed by Gomez on January 29, 2010 and 
by Phillips on February 3, 2010). (Ex. 4). Gomez remained in possession of the property under 
this memorandum agreement until approximately May 31, 2010, which was thirty days after 
Gomez had given his written notice to Phillips that he would be vacating the property. (Ex. 6). 
Gomez vacated the premises in a timely manner without incident. 
On February 4,2010, Phillips, through counsel, sent Gomez a letter demanding that Gomez 
perform under the real estate purchase and sale agreement. (Ex. 7). Gomez did not formally 
respond. 
Phillips re listed the property for sale in the spring of 2010, with the assistance of a licensed 
realtor. In connection with the decision to relist the property, an appraisal was obtained from Jody 
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L. Graham. (Ex. 5). The appraisal report was admitted into evidence not to prove the truth of the 
asserted value of the property, but only as evidence of the reasonableness of Phillips' actions, and 
the steps taken by Phillips, in re-listing the property for sale. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 136, L. 2-21). 
In June 2010, an offer from an unrelated third party to purchase the property for $530,000 
was received and accepted. The sale closed on June 21, 2010, with a purchase price of $527,500. 
On August 13, 2012, Phillips' counsel sent Gomez a letter demanding payment for the lost 
"benefit of the bargain" damages sustained as a result of Gomez's failure to purchase the property 
as agreed. By his demand, Phillips sought the difference between the proceeds of sale ($527,500) 
and the price agreed upon by Gomez ($660,000), less the earnest money received ($62,040 net of 
commissions), for a total damage claim of $70,460, plus interest. (Ex. 8). 
Gomez failed to pay the amount claimed in the demand. Phillips filed suit on November 
26, 2013. Phillips now claims damages in the amount of$60, 143.66 after giving Gomez credit for 
the $66,000.00 Earnest Money payment. (Ex. 15). This damage claim consists of: (1) the 
$51,620.50 difference between what the sales proceeds would have been if Gomez had closed the 
sale and what the sales proceeds were upon closing with the eventual purchaser; (2) $3,960.00 as 
the commission paid to Coldwell Banker; (3) $1,776.00 as trustees fees associated with the closing 
of the sale to Gomez; ( 4) $2,187.90 as attorney fees associated with the closing of the sale to 
Gomez; and (5) $1,000.00 as the cost of the appraisal obtained after Gomez's breach. (Ex. 15). 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court correctly conclude that Phillips was precluded from 
recovering damages from Gomez for the loss of the benefit of the bargain, because Phillips had 
already elected his remedy to accept the earnest money from Gomez as liquidated damages? 
II. Gomez should be awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and pursuant to the contract that is the subject of this case, as well as 
Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121, and/or 12-123. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
Appellate review of the trial court's decision is limited to a determination of whether the 
evidence admitted at trial supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the facts support 
the conclusions of law. Clayson v. Zehe, 153 Idaho 228, 232 (2012). The Court exercises free 
review of the trial court's conclusions oflaw. Id. 
II. The District Court Correctly Held That Phillips Was Precluded from Further 
Recovery, Because He Had Elected Liquidated Damages as His Remedy. 
Phillips is precluded from recovering damages for the loss of the benefit of the bargain, 
because Phillips already elected his remedy to accept the earnest money from Gomez as liquidated 
damages for Gomez's breach. 
A. This Case Is Governed by The Law of Contracts. 
The Court's decision in this case is governed by the law of contracts. See, e.g., The 
Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Allan G. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 258 (1993). The Court must give 
effect to the parties' intent at the time of contracting, as manifested by the terms of the contract. 
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In construing the contract, the Court "must consider it as a whole and give meaning to all of its 
provisions to the extent possible." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 257. If the language of the contract is 
clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law. Lamprecht v. 
Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-186 (2003). An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. Id. 
B. The Contract at Issue in This Case. 
The contract at issue in this case consists of five documents: (1) An RE-21 form Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement executed by Gomez on October 27, 2008, and by Phillips on October 
30, 2008. (Ex. 2A). (2) An RE-11 form Addendum, marked #1, and signed by Gomez on October 
27, 2008, and by Phillips on October 30, 2008. (Ex. 2B). (3) A manuscript document titled 
"Counter-Offer# 3" signed by both parties on October 28, 2008. (Ex. 2F). (4) A manuscript 
document titled "Residential Lease," signed by Gomez on October 29, 2008, and by Phillips on 
October 30, 2008. (Ex. 2G). (5) An RE-11 form Addendum, marked #2, signed by both parties 
on December 2, 2009. (Ex. 21). (R. Vol. I, p. 143, L. 16 et seq.). 
Of the documents forming the contract, the following contract provisions are relevant to 
the issues on appeal: (1) Form RE-21, paragraph 3(A) (Ex. 2A, p. 1); (2) Form RE-21, paragraph 
28 (Ex. 2A, p. 3); (3) Form RE-11, Addendum #1, item number 2 (Ex. 2B); and (4) Counteroffer 
# 3 (Ex. 2F). 
Paragraph 3(A) of form RE-21 provides that "BUYER hereby deposits Sixty-Six Thousand 
and Zero/100 DOLLARS as Earnest Money evidenced by: ... personal check ... and a receipt is 
hereby acknowledged. Earnest Money to be deposited in trust account ... upon acceptance by all 
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parties and shall be held by: ... Listing Broker ... for the benefit of the parties hereto." (Ex. 2A, 
p. 1). Paragraph 3(A) also indicates that the "earnest money [was] to be transferred from ID# 
98978587," (Ex. 2A, p. 1), which was a reference to the form RE-21 offer made by Gomez on 
October 14, 2008, which was not accepted by Phillips. (Ex. 1, p. 1 ). 
Paragraph 28 of form RE-21 provides in relevant part that "If BUYER defaults in the 
performance of this Agreement, SELLER has the option of: ( 1) accepting the Earnest Money as 
liquidated damages or (2) pursuing any other lawful right and/or remedy to which SELLER may 
be entitled." (Ex. 2A, p. 3). It further provides, in relevant part, that "SELLER and BUYER 
specifically acknowledge and agree that if SELLER elects to accept the Earnest Money as 
liquidated damages, such shall be SELLER'S sole and exclusive remedy." (Ex. 2A, p. 3). 
Item number 2 on RE-11 Addendum # 1 characterizes "[t]he $66,000.00 down payment 
[as] non-refundable" and provides that the payment "will be released to seller upon buyers written 
acceptance of the inspection and credited to buyer at closing." (Ex. 2B). Counteroffer# 3 affirms 
the nature of the $66,000.00 payment as earnest money. (Ex. 2F, p. 1, ,r 2). 
C. The Relevant Intent of the Parties is Found in The Contract. 
After considering the evidence presented at trial and applying the terms of the contract to 
the facts, the District Court concluded that the relief Phillips now seeks was not part of the parties' 
agreement. The District Court found that the parties had not "specifically contemplated the 
measures in the contract that are now under examination." (R. Vol. I, p. 147). The court reasoned 
that "[i]t is not feasible to establish what the actual intent of the parties was when a form contract 
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is used, because the specifics of the form provisions were never specifically negotiated or even 
called to the attention of either party." (R. Vol. I., p. 147). 
The parties simply did not consider, discuss, or reach agreement about the possibility of 
the situation at bar. Because the parties did not address it at the time of contracting, the Court 
should decline to read into the contract the remedy requested by Phillips, which would directly 
contradict the plain language of the remedial provisions of the contract contained in Paragraph 28 
of form RE-21. (Ex. 2A p. 3). 
Though the parties did not consider, at the time of contracting, the precise issue presented 
in this case, the language of at least three provisions of the contract suggests that the parties did 
contemplate the issue of remedies in the event of Gomez's breach and that the earnest money 
would serve as liquidated damages. Paragraph numbers 5, 13, and 14 of Counteroffer# 3 (Ex. 
2F), address three potential breach scenarios and the remedies for each. The first is breach of the 
lease agreement. The second is failure of the sale to close. The third is buyer's bankruptcy. 
Paragraph 5 of Counteroffer # 3 states that if the buyer breaches the lease agreement, the 
lease being a "material condition of this Purchase and Sale Agreement," the same "shall constitute 
a material breach of Buyer's obligations [sic] the terms of this Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement." (Ex. 2F, p. 1). Paragraph 5 then identifies the Seller's remedy: "Seller may, at its 
sole election, terminate this Agreement and the said lease and retain Buyer's earnest money 
payment, together with any lease payments Buyer may have made, as liquidated damages and 
Buyer shall have no further right or claim of interest in the subject premises." (Ex. 2F, p. 1). 
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Paragraph 13 of Counteroffer # 3 states that if "this sale does not close, Coldwell Banker 
Tomlinson Group may retain the $3960.00 being paid to it as its sole compensation for its services 
as an agent in this matter." (Ex. 2F, p. 2-3). This provision shows that the parties contemplated 
their realtor's remedy in the event of Gomez's breach. While this provision does not address a 
remedy available to Phillips, it shows that the parties had given some consideration to what would 
happen in the event Gomez breached the agreement. 
Paragraph 14 of Counteroffer # 3 states in relevant part that: 
[i]f Buyer should file for bankruptcy at any time prior to the closing of this 
transaction, Buyer agrees that such filing shall constitute a material breach of the 
terms of both this Purchase and Sale Agreement and its lease with Seller and Seller 
may, in that event, immediately, without demand or notice, take possession of the 
premises and retain any and all monies paid to it by Buyer, whether in the form of 
earnest money or lease payments, as liquidated damages which sum Buyer and 
Seller agree would be fair and reasonable liquidated damages to Seller for such 
breach of this Agreement. 
(Ex. 2F, p. 3). 
These provisions are significant evidence of the parties' intent, at the time of contracting, 
regarding Phillips' remedies in the event of a breach by Gomez. It is clear, at least in these 
contexts, that the parties intended the earnest money deposit to serve as liquidated damages. And 
if at the time of contracting the parties did not contemplate the precise situation they now face, and 
therefore did not express their intent on this issue, then the Court should decline to read into the 
contract the extraordinary remedy Phillips now seeks. 
11 
D. The Contract Does Not Allow the Remedy Phillips Seeks. 
Paragraph 28 ofRE-21, (Ex. 2A, p. 3), required Phillips to elect his remedy in the event of 
Gomez's breach. He could not retain the earnest money and sue for damages. Phillips' actions in 
retaining the earnest money confirm that he elected liquidated damages. 
In his brief, Phillips acknowledges the absence of any explicit authority in the real estate 
contract to pursue this lawsuit in addition to his acceptance of the $66,000.00 earnest money 
payment. He agrees that "( t ]here is no language ... in the RE-21 agreement, or in the RE-11 
addenda executed by the parties, addressing a situation, like this one, where earnest money is 
released by a buyer and dispersed to a seller long before a contemplated closing." (Appellant's 
Br. p. 6). That acknowledgment should end the argument. 
A general rule recognized by this Court in Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253 (1993), is that "in the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, it probably should be assumed that the vendor is free to 
claim liquidated or actual damages, as his option." Id. at 258 (emphasis added). Phillips would 
turn this principle on its head and ask this Court to conclude that in the absence of an agreement 
preventing him from doing so, he should be allowed to claim both liquidated and actual damages. 
Such a result would be contrary not only to the law of contracts but also to the contract at issue in 
this case, including Paragraph 28 of RE-21, (Ex. 2A). 
Phillips continues by arguing that he has the right to sue for damages because "there [is 
not] any language anywhere in the agreement ... suggesting (that he] had conceded or given up 
[his] right" to elect his remedy and he had told Gomez that he was electing "to pursue either the 
remedy of specific performance or the recovery of his actual damages." (Appellant's Br. p. 6). 
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He claims that he made it clear by writings subsequent to the contract that he was in fact electing 
to sue for damages. (Id. at p. 6-7). 
Phillips argues that he did not in fact accept the $66,000.00 earnest money as liquidated 
damages. (Appellant's Br. p. 6-7). He further argues that "[t]here is nothing in the record that 
would indicate Phillips ever thought about accepting, much less elected or agreed to accept, the 
non-refundable earnest money the Trust had received from Gomez as liquidated damages in lieu 
of its [sic] actual damages." (Appellant's Br. p. 7). 
By emphasizing that the earnest money deposit was non-refundable, Phillips seems to take 
the position that that money was paid and earned upon receipt solely as consideration for the 
delayed closing. But that intent on the part of Phillips is found nowhere in the contract. If the 
parties had contemplated making the earnest money deposit something other than earnest money, 
they could have made that clear by not calling it earnest money. They could have called it a fee 
or consideration for a delayed closing (similar to consideration for an option agreement). Instead, 
they called it both earnest money and non-refundable. Because the $66,000.00 payment retained 
its character as earnest money, the terms of paragraph 28, RE-21, control. 
Phillips' unilateral, subjective intention was not part of the real estate purchase and sale 
agreement. His expression of intent does not change the fact that he had no right to retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages and sue for loss of the benefit of the bargain damages. 
E. The Law Does Not Allow the Remedy Phillips Seeks. 
Phillips cites the case of The Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Allan G. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253 
( 1993 ), for the proposition that "the presence of a liquidated damage clause in an earnest money 
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agreement does not preclude the non-defaulting party from recovering its actual damages suffered 
when the other party breaches an agreement to purchase real estate." (Appellant's Br. p. 7). He 
argues that the language in the standard form real estate contract used in the Lipsky case is so 
similar to the language in the RE-21 form at issue in this case, that the Court should conclude that 
he is allowed to recover his actual damages on top of liquidated damages. (Id. at p. 8). 
Phillips' argument is flawed in several ways. First, the Lipsky case held that the seller had 
the option to accept the earnest money as liquidated damages or sue for specific performance or 
actual damages, because that is what the contract, as drafted, allowed. Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 258. 
The buyer's argument in Lipsky was that the liquidated damages clause contained in the contract 
did not give the seller the option but instead required the seller to accept the earnest money as its 
exclusive remedy for buyer's breach. Id. at 257. 
Contrary to Phillips' argument in this case, the remedy clause contained in the Lipsky 
contract is not similar to the remedy clause at issue in this case. In Lipsky, the clause reads, in 
relevant part, that in the event of buyer's breach, "the earnest money shall be forfeited and 
considered as liquidated damages to Seller, and Buyer's interest in the premises shall be 
immediately terminated. . .. Such forfeiture and acceptance by Seller or Broker of the earnest 
money as liquidated damages does not constitute a waiver of other remedies available to Seller or 
Broker." Id. 
In this case, the remedy clause in paragraph 28 of form RE-21 reads: "If BUYER defaults 
in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER has the option of: (1) accepting the Earnest Money 
as liquidated damages or (2) pursuing any other lawful right and/or remedy to which SELLER may 
14 
be entitled." (Ex. 2A p. 3). It further provides, in relevant part, that "SELLER and BUYER 
specifically acknowledge and agree that if SELLER elects to accept the Earnest Money as 
liquidated damages, such shall be SELLER'S sole and exclusive remedy." (Id.) 
In Lipsky, the remedy clause contained two seemingly contradictory provisions which the 
Court recognized when it said the clause was "poorly written" and "inartfully drafted." On the 
one hand, the clause said the buyer's earnest money "shall be forfeited and considered as liquidated 
damages" to the seller in the event of the buyer's default, but then on the other hand the clause 
specifically said that seller was not precluded from seeking its other remedies ( e.g., actual 
damages, specific performance) despite the "forfeiture and acceptance by Seller ... of the earnest 
money as liquidated damages." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 257. In other words, that "poorly written" 
remedy clause seemed to allow the seller to accept and retain the earnest money and sue for 
additional damages. The Court in Lipsky did not specifically address the issue of whether a non-
defaulting seller may retain earnest money as a partial sati.~faction and then sue for additional 
damages. The Court simply concluded that the contract in that case allowed the seller to choose 
one or the other of the available remedies, but not both. 
Phillips' comparison of the case at bar with the Lipsky case, and his distinction between 
the two cases only on the basis that non-refundable earnest money was not at issue in the Lipsky 
case, ignores the actual holding and reasoning of the Lipsky case. The seller in Lipsky got to sue 
for damages, because the contract said she could. Because the Court had to give effect to the 
contract as a whole, the Court had to read the "liquidated damages" provision in context with the 
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preservation of rights provision, which specifically authorized the action taken by the seller in the 
Lipsky case. 
This case is no more comparable to the Lipsky case on the issue of election of remedies 
than it is on the issue of non-refundable earnest money deposits. Resolution of this case, like 
resolution of that case, comes down to giving effect to the terms of the contract as written. Lipsky 
does not support Phillips' argument that he should be allowed to retain the earnest money and also 
sue for damages. 
Phillips cites Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wn. App. 387, 390-91 (Wash. App. Div. 1, 1986), 717 
P.2d 285, 288-89 (1986), for a similar proposition - that the "either/or language" of a real estate 
purchase and sale agreement gives a seller the option to sue for damages instead of accepting 
earnest money as liquidated damages. Again he notes that the Noble case did not involve the non-
refundable earnest money issue facing the parties in this case. 
Phillips' reliance upon the Noble case is unavailing. The issue before this Court is not the 
same as the issue before the court in Noble. In Noble, the issue was whether the specific language 
of the liquidated damages clause in the contract at issue in that case precluded the seller from 
seeking actual damages. The contract in the Noble case read in pertinent part: [i]n the event of 
default by Buyer, Seller shall have the election to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages, 
or to institute suit to enforce any right Seller has." Noble, 717 P.2d 285, 286. The issue was 
whether this remedy clause limited the seller's damages to the earnest money paid by the buyer. 
The court applied the general rules that "the interpretation of a contract is a question of 
law," that "[c]ontracts should be construed to reflect the intent of the parties," and that "[a]bsent 
16 
disputed evidence concerning the intent of the parties, the construction or legal effect of a contract 
is determined by the court as a matter oflaw." Id. at 287. The court held that the contract allowed 
the seller "to elect to have liquidated damages or retain all his rights." Id. The court reasoned that 
a "liquidated damages clause does not preclude a party from suing for actual damages if that right 
is preserved in the contract between the parties," Id. In Noble, that contract right clearly was 
preserved. Thus, the seller was allowed to sue the breaching buyer for actual damages and was 
not required to accept the earnest money as liquidated damages. 
The issue in this case is different. Here, the question is whether the contract allows Phillips 
to retain the earnest money and also sue for damages. Like the contract in Noble, the contract in 
this case gives the seller a choice of remedies. The issue before this Court is whether Phillips can 
choose both options. The contract in this case does not give Phillips that right. 
Finally, Phillips cites Ravenstar LLC v. One Ski Hill Place LLC, 012816 COCA, 14 CA 
2401 (29-36) (Colorado 2016). Again, the Ravenstar case is unhelpful, because it does not address 
the issues presented in the present case. In the Ravenstar case, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
considered the issue of whether optional liquidated damages provisions are enforceable as a matter 
of law (i.e., provisions that give a non-breaching party the option to choose between liquidated 
damages and actual damages). Id. It held that the mere presence of an option to seek actual 
damages does not render the liquidated damages provision invalid as a matter of law. 
In its analysis the court noted that some states allow such provisions and some do not. 
Idaho is one of the states that does allow optional liquidated damages provisions. The court 
recognized that this remedy issue was "one to be determined by the parties in their agreement ... 
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noting that a party who opts to proceed under a valid liquidated damages provision may not in 
addition pursue other rights." Id. (internal citation omitted). 
In the present case, under the contract as written, Phillips had the option to either retain the 
earnest money deposit as liquidated damages or sue for damages - not both. The contract did not 
provide that Phillips could retain the earnest money deposit as a partial satisfaction of Phillips' 
eventual money judgment for actual damages. Absent express language in the contract giving 
Phillips the right to do so, he did not have that right. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent Gomez asks this Court to affirm the District Court's 
Judgment re-entered August 31, 2016. Gomez also requests an award of attorney fees and costs 
on appeal. 
DATED: April 3, 2017 FISHER LAW OFFICE, P LC 
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